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Abstract—Although many electronic voting protocols have
been proposed, their practical application faces various chal-
lenges. One of these challenges is, that these protocols require
election authorities to perform complex tasks like generating keys
in a distributed manner and decrypting votes in a distributed
and verifiable manner. Although corresponding key generation
and decryption protocols exist, they are not used in real-world
elections for several reasons: The few existing implementations
of these protocols and their corresponding interfaces are not
designed for people with non technical background and thus
not suitable for use by most election authorities. In addition,
it is difficult to explain the security model of the protocols, but
legal provisions generally require transparency. We implemented
a smartphone application for election authorities featuring dis-
tributed key generation and verifiable distributed decryption of
votes. In addition, we prepared education material throughout
based on formulated metaphors for election authorities in order to
explain the security of the application. We evaluated the usability
of the application and understanding of the underlying security
model, concluding that the application is usable for non-experts
in computer science. While the participants were able to carry
out the tasks, it became clear, that they did not have a clear
understanding of the underlying security model, despite having
viewed our educational material. We suggest improvements to
this material as future work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic voting is increasingly used for different kinds
of elections, e.g. parliamentary elections in Estonia [1] and
Norway [2], and non-parliamentary ones like the presidential
election at Université catholique de Louvain [3] and the elec-
tion at the International Association for Cryptologic Research
[4]. While different remote electronic voting systems are used,
they all have in common that they are based on different
cryptographic primitives and protocols in order to provide
secrecy and verifiability at the same time. Most of these
electronic voting systems are designed in the following way:
The voter makes her selection, encrypts her selection with the
election key, and sends her vote to a public web bulletin board.
This board publishes the encrypted vote together with the
voter’s identity ensuring eligibility and supporting verifiability.
At the end of the election, the encrypted votes are anonymized
by the use of a mix-net or by building a homomorphic sum.
Eventually, the anonymized votes (in case of the mix-net
anonymization) or the sum (in case of the homomorphic sum)
are/is decrypted.
If the decryption key were in the hands of a single election
authority, this authority could decrypt the non-anonymized en-
crypted votes from the web bulletin board and thereby violate
secrecy. Therefore, it is crucial to distribute the decryption
key among several authorities in a way that an ideal trade-
off function between secrecy and robustness is provided while
robustness means the ability to decrypt successfully the votes
(or the sum) also in case some of the election authorities are
not available. An ideal trade-off function between secrecy and
robustness is defined by the fact that secrecy improvements
and robustness decrease (or vice versa) can be adjusted pro-
portionally, so that a desired trade-off could be easily achieved
by corresponding adjustments. Protocols providing such an
ideal trade-off function have been proposed in the literature
[5], [6] and implementations of these protocols are available
[7], [8]. However, these protocols and implementations have
not yet arrived in practice as the elections at the Université
catholique de Louvain [3], in Austria [9], in Estonia [1], Spain
[10], and Norway [2] confirm. For instance, during the election
in Norway in 2011 [2], the election key was distributed among
the members by the electoral board, yet generated by two
entities, the collaboration of which could thus violate secrecy.
We postulate that approaches with non-ideal trade-off functions
are in place because existing implementations do not meet
real-world election settings. For instance, election authorities
might well posses smartphones but not laptops, or it might not
be possible to rely on established public key infrastructures
(PKI), or election authorities cannot be assumed to have a
background in computer science.
In order to improve the situation in future, the first goal
of our research project is to develop a usable application
implementing distributed cryptography addressing real-world
election settings. Elections are bound to rigorous legal require-
ments due to their high social impact. Apart from security
requirements, transparency of the entire election process is of
central importance for establishing trust in the election and
its outcome [11], and its security needs to be communicated
[12]. Therefore, the second goal of our research project is to
explain the need for such an application, as well as the security
properties and security models underlying the application.
As our contribution, we provide a smartphone application
for (1) the generation, exchange and validation of personal
public communication keys of the election authorities, (2) the
distributed generation of a public key used in the election
for encrypting the votes (in this paper referred to as the
election key) and of the corresponding private key shares used
for decryption; and (3) the verifiable distributed decryption
of a set of encrypted votes which are downloaded from
the web bulletin board. We furthermore developed education
material for election authorities, which would accompany the
application. Eventually, we initiated a user evaluation to assess
the application’s usability and its understandability. The results
of the first evaluation group (five participants) show that the
smartphone application is usable according to the established
usability criteria and that participants properly performed the
required checks. The participants were able to understand
those parts of the security model that were addressed in the
education material. However, they were less able to answer
those questions requiring transfer skills which indicates that
even more effective education is necessary. Therefore, we
decided not to continue the evaluation until we improve the
education process.
II. ELECTION SCENARIO
Our project setting is close to real-world elections: we con-
sider elections (or handle election districts) with one thousand
voters, since 824 is an average number of postal voters in a
district in Germany [13] and five election authorities, because
there must be at least five election authorities per electoral
districts in Germany [14]. Additionally, election authorities are
citizens without special information security knowledge. Fur-
thermore, we assume election authorities not to have (national)
eID, as not all countries have issued eID cards, and even in
those that have, the percentage of population possessing the
eID is not big enough1
We consider in our research project an abstract, yet widely
implemented voting protocol based on El-Gamal2encryption:
In the election setup phase, an El-Gamal election key (together
with the corresponding private key shares) is generated by the
election authorities with a corresponding distributed key gen-
eration protocol. During the vote casting, votes are encrypted
with this public El-Gamal election key and submitted to a so-
called web bulletin board (WBB); i.e. a remote web server
with a database connection with the public having read access
and observers taking copies in order to observe whether the
WBB is not deleting votes. There, the encrypted votes are
stored together with some information identifying the voter.
We refer to these encrypted votes as personalized votes. In the
tallying phase these personalized votes are anonymized using
a verifiable re-encryption mix-net, e.g. the mix-net proposed
in [16]. The choice of mix-net as a way to anonymize the
votes has an impact on the efficiency of the decryption process.
This stems from the fact that as opposed to one ciphertext
decryption (as in the case of homomorphic sum tallying), all
individual anonymized ciphertexts need to be decrypted. Yet
we decided to build upon the mix-net approach because it has
been used in parliamentary elections in Estonia [1] and Norway
[2]. The election authorities download the anonymized votes
from the WBB and run the verifiable distributed decryption
protocol for calculating the election result.
The goal of our project is to support election authorities
during election setup and tallying for the described abstract
1As of 31.10.2012, only 17,5M of population in
Germany possessed the eID card: http://http://www.
personalausweisportal.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2012/
Wachsendes-Interesse-am-neuen-Personalausweis.html?nn=3043614.
2The El-Gamal parameters are 2048 bits for the generator and 224 bits for
the multiplicative group order due to the standard recommendation in [15].
voting protocol. We assume that they either meet in person
or make phone/video calls in both phases, i.e. there is an
out-of-band channel to interchange information3. However, it
might be that individual election authorities are not able to
show up or no longer behave honestly. Therefore, we need
to implement a threshold distributed key generation protocol
and thus a threshold verifiable distributed decryption protocol,
enabling the tallying of results even if only a threshold of elec-
tion authorities is participating. For our particular setting we
decided to choose a threshold of three, which we consider to
provide an optimal trade-off between secrecy and robustness.
For practicability, it was decided to develop a smartphone
application, as these devices are nowadays widespread, and
the number of people using them still grows4. Furthermore,
smartphones are equipped with mobile Internet that can be
used for communications in case setting up a wireless network
is not possible or requires too much organizational effort.
III. PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT
In this section we propose and discuss various design
decisions for the development of the application.
A. Hardware and Software
We developed a prototype application on the Android
platform due to Android’s flexibility and openness. Corre-
spondingly, the application is written in Java. We use two ex-
ternal libraries: aSmack [17] to implement the communication
between the smartphones and SpongeCastle [18], which is an
Android version of the BouncyCastle library, to implement the
cryptographic operations, as these are, to our best knowledge,
currently the most popular and well-developed libraries that
are applicable for these purposes on Android.
B. Cryptographic Primitives and Protocols
First of all we had to decide which distributed key gener-
ation protocol we are going to implement. Several protocols
for threshold secret sharing, which is sharing a secret between
several participants, so that a threshold amount of them could
reconstruct the secret by cooperating, have been proposed
in the literature such as [6], [19]–[21]; some with central
authority, some without. In our application, we use a protocol
introduced by Pedersen [6]. One significant advantage of this
protocol is that the keys shares are generated and distributed in
fully decentralized manner; i.e. no single entity ever possesses
the key which is important for elections (this entity could
break secrecy of the vote). Furthermore, the protocol includes
a commitment round, which allows for verifying the correct
execution of the distributed key generation protocol. This is
important to know before starting the election, as otherwise
the key could be distributed incorrectly such that voters would
cast their votes but these could not be decrypted and thus
tallying would not be possible. To our best knowledge, this
protocol is currently the most suitable for practical use on
smartphones. Note, that Gennaro et. al show in [5] that the keys
3This channel is needed at certain points for detecting misbehavior of the
entities involved in protocol.
4This is mentioned, e.g., in http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/
are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history.
generated with Pedersen’s protocol [6] are not random under
certain circumstances. In the same paper they propose their
own distributed verifiable secret sharing protocol, which solves
the outlined problem, while being less efficient. However,
Cortier et. al recently proved [8] that Pedersen’s protocol can
be used securely in the context of distributing El-Gamal keys.
For verifiable distributed decryption, we implement the
protocol described by Cramer et al [22]. The protocol builds
upon Pedersen’s protocol adaptation for distributively gener-
ating an El-Gamal key pair, uses the private key shares to
distributively decrypt the El-Gamal ciphertexts, and generates
zero-knowledge proofs for the correctness of the decryption5.
Both protocols rely on secure communication channels be-
tween authorities. To ensure secure communication channels,
we decided to implement the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
[23] for the authorities to exchange secret AES keys with
each other. The AES keys have the length of 128 bits and
are used for encrypting further communications in counter
mode according to [24]. In addition, the RSA signatures
are used for authentication purposes, in the Diffie-Hellman
exchange, as well as in further communications. According
to the recommendations in [15], the RSA keys have a bit
length of 2048. As there is no established PKI, the RSA key
pairs need first to be generated and distributed. Since we
assume that there is an out-of-band communication channel
between the authorities, they are able to use it to verify
whether they received the proper public keys, i.e. there was
no attacker running a man-in-the middle attack. For the RSA
key distribution and verification, we implement a protocol
based upon short authentication strings, described in [25]
as symmetrised group protocol. A protocol using the same
approach (albeit designed for agreement between two parties
instead of a group) has been formally proven secure in [26]. A
similar approach has also been implemented in [27] for their
application. While the implementation in [27] uses SHA-1 as
second pre-image resistant hash function, we rely on SHA-256,
as recommended in [15].
The short passphrases, that are to be compared, are the
24-bit strings. For displaying the passphrases, the PGP Word
List [28] is used, substituting each byte of the hash value
with a specific word. Thus, instead of comparing the 24-bit
strings, the users have to compare the equality of a passphrase
that consists of three words, which improves usability greatly.
As every election authority is expected to be aware that it
is important to follow the procedures, we assume that they
attentively perform the verification of passphrases.
Both the distributed key generation and the verifiable
distributed decryption protocol need one entity to start the
protocols and to invite the others to join. Therefore, it was
decided to have a head of the group of election authorities who
has these responsibilities. As this one can easily be replaced by
another one (necessary due to the threshold) and does not have
more power with respect to violating any security properties,
we decided to leave the selection to the election authorities.
5The implementations of both of these protocols were proposed by [7], [8],
but neither of them is usable for the setting we have determined.
C. Web Bulletin Board Involvement
At several stages in the setup and tallying, the WBB, as
the central server of the Internet voting system, is involved.
These stages are indicated and explained in the following:
During the setup phase, the present, invited election authorities
are announced on the WBB and the head labeled accordingly.
This has two reasons: first it is more transparent who are the
election authorities, and second it is only necessary to type this
information once because otherwise each election authority
has to enter this information manually in their smartphones
upon starting the application. This improves the usability,
while it has no effect on the security. Furthermore, all election
authorities send the public key computed during the distributed
key generation protocol to the WBB. This is necessary to load
it into the main voting application and as such this key is
available for the voter to encrypt her vote. In order to minimize
the trust in the WBB, we decided to include in the setup
phase a verification step; i.e. the election authorities verify
the election key6. In order to enable the election authority
in conducting this verification, the hash value of the public
key is displayed by the smartphone and also accessible on
the WBB7. In the tallying phase, the smartphone application
downloads the list of encrypted and anonymized votes from
the WBB. After the verifiable distributed decryption, the
smartphone application of the head sends the decrypted votes,
the results and the corresponding zero-knowledge proofs of the
correctness of decryption to the WBB. Note, due to the proofs
it is not necessary that everyone sends this information but the
WBB as well es external observers can verify these proofs.
D. Communication Protocol
The different instances of the application have to commu-
nicate with each other in order to execute the before mentioned
cryptographic protocols. There are in general several options
to implement the communication between the smartphones
such as Bluetooth, SMS, WiFi-Direct or (proprietary) instant
message protocols like ICQ, MSN or Skype. We have to
transfer large amounts of data in particular due to the number
of voters and to enable communication regardless of the
geographical location of the election authorities. Therefore,
we decided to rely on one of the instant message protocols.
We decided to use the open-source XMPP protocol for its
flexibility, i.e. the possibility to add our own message types.
In order to communicate with each other over XMPP, Jabber
IDs are used8.
IV. ELECTION PROCEDURE
Below we describe a walkthrough for the election setup
and for the tallying phase with the developed application. The
6As mentioned above, it is assumed that the authorities would follow the
procedures and verify the election key.
7Note, that due to the length of a hash value of a public key, for the sake
of usability we chose not to output it as a passphrase of PGP words as used
in the distributed key generation protocol. Instead we display the hash value
as a hexadecimal string, truncated to 160 bits (40 characters).
8In our implementation we decided to use Gmail accounts as many people
nowadays have such an account and to our best knowledge, it is currently the
most widespread type of Jabber IDs. However, one could easily use accounts
on any other XMPP server, including the private ones, that are established
specifically for the purposes of the election.
(a) Login. (b) Verification of communica-
tion keys.
(c) Accepting invitation to par-
ticipate in distributed key gen-
eration.
(d) Verification of election key.
Fig. 1. Distributed key generation on the smartphone application.
interfaces have been developed in an iterative process involv-
ing technical and non-technical potential election authorities,
furthering the goal of making the application usable.
A. Setup Phase
Stage 1 - Tutorial: The election authorities get a tutorial
on the functionality and security of the application and the
Internet voting system (see Section VI).
Stage 2 - Announcing members and head: The election
authorities announce their names and Jabber IDs. They also
announce the head (after having discussed who should take
the duties of the head). The administration staff of the WBB
announces this information via the WBB.
Stage 3 - Installing the application: The election authorities
download the application from the trusted public institution
(TPI) they trust via secure HTTPS connection, or from the
Google Play Store, if this institution is registered as a certified
developer, and install it on their smartphone.
Stage 4 - Starting the application: The election authorities
start the application and enter their Jabber credentials9, and a
WBB web address provided to them by the election organizers
(see Figure 1(a)).
Stage 5 - Communication key exchange: After a successful
login into the application (i.e. the election URL and the
9These are stored in the application and are only used for XMPP login.
credentials are correct), the application displays the name of
the election, as well as the name of the head of the election
authorities as announced on the WBB. The election authorities
have to confirm that they agree to participate in this election
with the named person being the head of election authorities10.
After the confirmation, a random RSA key pair is generated by
each of the applications. The public keys are exchanged with
all other authorities. At the end of this stage, each smartphone
displays a passphrase (according to the protocol mentioned
in Section III-B) (see Figure 1(b)). The instructions on the
screen for the head are to read aloud this passphrase11. The
instructions for the others are to compare and only continue
if all have the same passphrase. In case the verification was
successful, the authorities may continue to the next step.
Stage 6 - Distributed (election) key generation: In this
stage, the head of the commission initiates the distributed
key generation protocol. This is done by inviting the other
election authorities (by selecting them from the displayed list).
At the same time, the other authorities wait for receiving an
invitation. Once they have received the invitation, the list of
invited authorities, as well as the name and threshold value
for the election is displayed (see Figure 1(c)). Then, they are
asked whether they agree on this list and on the threshold. This
is necessary to avoid the head inviting other people then the
ones he is supposed to invite, or setting the wrong threshold
value. After all election authorities accepted the invitation (as
no misbehavior was detected), the distributed key generation
protocol is executed. After its completion, each authority’s
smartphone sends a generated public key to the WBB.
Stage 7 - Verifying (election) key generation: The smart-
phone displays the hash value12 of the public key it computed
during the distributed key generation protocol. The instructions
for all election authorities are to compare the displayed value
with the one displayed on the WBB. If the value matches and
all authorities confirm the matching, this key is loaded into the
voting application to be used to encrypt votes13. The election
authorities may now close the application.
B. Tallying Phase
Stage 1 - Starting the application and running the dis-
tributed verifiable decryption: The election authorities start the
application and all anonymized votes are downloaded from
the WBB. The head initiates the decryption by inviting all
other election authorities to participate. At the same time the
other election authorities wait for this invitation. Once all
election authorities accepted the invitation14, the decryption
is started. The result of its successful completion is a list of
decrypted votes, the number of votes per candidate together
with corresponding proofs. The result is sent to the WBB from
the head. For increasing robustness, the authorities are then
10This is done to confirm that the person announced as the head by the
WBB is indeed the person the election authorities agreed on being the head.
11In the application the passphrase is called security phrase as pre-studies
show that people do not know what passphrase means here.
12In the application this hash value is called security code for the purpose
of understandability.
13The vote casting process is out of scope of our project.
14It is necessary to have the election authorities being involved because
otherwise the decryption could be started before the end of the election.
encouraged to create a backup of the data generated by the
application by exporting the data to external storage.
Stage 2 - Announcing the results: The result is displayed on
the WBB but also by each application of the election author-
ities. The election authorities compare the result displayed on
their smartphones with the one displayed by the WBB. They
then close the application and in case they want to get access
to the result again they just open the application again.
V. SECURITY PROPERTIES AND SECURITY MODEL
In order to check whether the authorities understand the
security properties and security model of the application, it
is important to be very precise about both. The identified
properties relevant for the Internet voting system – namely
robustness, secrecy, and integrity – and the corresponding
assumptions are determined and discussed in this section. For
the analysis we consider each of the entities involved with the
proposed application (each election authority and the WBB)
as well as outsider attackers (reading, deleting, modifying
messages that are interchanged between the involved entities)
as well as combinations being able to violate each of these
three properties. We first consider each election authority as
one unit including the person, the smartphone, the operating
system, and the application. We later discuss the different parts
and their impact on the security model.
Robustness means that it is possible to decrypt the
anonymized votes from the WBB. This is ensured if at least
a threshold amount of election authorities is available and
behaves correctly during the distributed decryption protocol. In
addition, it needs to be assumed that a communication network
with enough throughput is available, and we rely on the used
cryptographic primitives in place.
Secrecy means that it should be impossible to decrypt the
personalized, encrypted votes. This is ensured if at least a
threshold amount of election authorities is honest and behaves
correctly in any stage. This includes that they check the
passphrase and that the hash value of the election key displayed
on their smartphone and the one displayed on of the WBB
match. In addition, secrecy can currently only be ensured
if the WBB is trustworthy (if not, the WBB could send
the personalized votes and would obtain the corresponding
decrypted ones). From the voting system’s components we
need to trust that at least one mix node is honest, and, finally,
we rely on the cryptographic primitives in place.
Integrity means that it should be detected if the decrypted
and anonymized votes do not match. This is ensured if at least a
threshold amount of election authorities is honest and behaves
correctly at any stage. This includes that they check that the
proper result is published on the WBB. In addition, integrity
can currently only be ensured if the WBB is trustworthy.
Finally, we rely on the used cryptographic primitives.
Different ’Parts’ of the Election Authority. So far we
only considered each election authority as a unit. However,
actually it is not necessarily the person herself who might
be dishonest and for instance not join the decryption phase
or export the key share; it might also be the application
which is not implemented by the election authority due to the
necessary lack of technical knowledge; thus the downloaded
application could be malicious in arbitrary ways. Therefore,
it is recommended to have different trustworthy institutions
programing their own application. Then each election authority
downloads the application from a different institution. With
this, the above security model also holds on the application
level. The same problems also exist on the operating system
and the smartphone manufacturer level. However, here it is
not easy to find a solution matching the above mentioned
security model. As the election authorities are supposed to use
their own smartphones, we rely on whatever smartphones and
operating systems they have. Thus, the security model on these
levels actually depends on the concrete setting of an election,
i.e. which smartphones and which operating systems are used
by the election authorities.
Trustworthiness of the WBB. As seen, the current imple-
mentation builds upon the trustworthiness of the WBB. We
assume, however, that the security of the WBB is taken care
of outside of our application in real-world elections, especially
the high-stake ones. As such, for ensuring integrity and secrecy
of the votes, the PKI established among the voters and the
mix nodes can be used. In such a case, for example, for
ensuring secrecy the election authorities could be directed to
decrypt the votes only if these votes are signed by a threshold
amount of mix nodes. Furthermore, the WBB can be constantly
supervised by a trusted third party in order to ensure that
it does not arbitrarily change its content, thereby ensuring
integrity.
VI. EDUCATION MATERIAL
Transparency is an important property of elections as
for instance the German constitutional court stated referring
to the use of voting machines in Germany [29]. In recent
elections, most constituencies provide education material for
poll workers, such as for instance the state of Berlin [30]. This
material proves to be particularly crucial for Internet elections,
since the election authorities in Internet elections usually have
a high education, but are not specialists in computer science or
information security [31]. We therefore prepared, in addition
to the application itself, a training for election authorities.
This training aimed for communicating the motivation for
this application and a basic understanding of the application’s
objectives and security properties (including the underlying
security model). We use a metaphoric approach like many
others in security education literature, e.g. [32]–[34]. The
challenge is to select appropriate metaphors, i.e. the election
authorities build a mental model on how the application works
which allows them to deduce the security properties and the
security model properly.
In the following, we first introduce the metaphors used for
the different cryptographic primitives and protocols. Then, we
propose the structure of the education tutorial.
A. Metaphors for Cryptographic Primitives
Asymmetric encryption: For the concept of asymmetric
encryption, we followed a well-established approach, namely
the metaphor of padlocks and the corresponding key. This
concept has for instance been used by Keller et al. [35]. As
(a) Locks, keys and
seals.
(b) Verification of communication keys.
(c) Partially opening encrypted votes.
Fig. 2. Metaphors used for cryptography in the education material.
locks can only be used to protect one object (e.g. a letter inside
an envelope), we introduced the concept of producing several
locks for one key. Furthermore, key pairs can be identified by
equal colours of keys and locks.
Digital signature: We use similar to many other ap-
proaches a seal imprint in the same color as the lock. The idea
is that the seal imprint in one color can only be produced by the
person owning the key in exactly that same color (see Figure
2(a)). This essentially corresponds to the concept of seals in
the physical world. Seal imprints can only be produced by the
owner of the corresponding seal (key).
B. Metaphors for Cryptographic Protocols
Voting protocol: As metaphor for encrypting and signing
votes, we decided to follow the two envelope approach known
and experienced from postal voting. The inner layer is a neutral
envelope, identical for all voters, which is closed with the
election lock. The outer layer is bound to the voter’s identity.
This metaphor is also used in Estonia to explain their Internet
voting system [36]. The mix-net is represented by a box in
which all the votes are put, closed and then shuffled. Again
this is very similar to the recent tallying process. Here poll
workers are supposed to first shuffle the ballot box and then
open it. Eventually, the web bulletin board (WBB), which is
used to announce any public data, is a metaphor in itself and
as such can be directly represented by bulletin boards known
from the physical world.
Verification of communication keys: The exchanged pub-
lic keys must be validated by the authorities by comparing
a hash value (of all other public keys). In order to avoid
explaining second pre-image resistance of cryptographic hash
functions, we use the following metaphor: First, authorities
exchange colored public locks. Second, after all colored locks
have been exchanged, the mix color of all lock colors is
obtained. The mix color represents the outcome of the second
pre-image resistant hash function applied to the concatenation
of all public keys (see Figure 2(b)). This metaphoric approach
has been used to communicate the concept of one-way func-
tions used to teach Diffie-Hellman secret sharing [37]–[39].
Due to the conceptual similarity of one-way functions and
second pre-image resistant hash functions, we consider the
color metaphor to be a proper approach.
Cryptographic key sharing: Many works, see for instance
[40], rely on the idea of splitting keys physically apart as
metaphor for cryptographic key sharing. However, this concept
does not work for schemes being robust against single entities
being malicious. Therefore, we introduced the concept of each
share being part of a description used to build the key. As these
descriptions are not disjoint it is possible to reconstruct the key
based on a subset of all shares. As it is necessary to build the
key, we also explain that a computer program is necessary to
be involved and the lock is stored as key information in a file.
Distributed decryption: One particular challenge of our
approach, as opposed to the Estonian Internet voting system,
has been the explanation of distributed decryption. We dis-
cussed several approaches and decided eventually that each
election authority holding a key reconstruction description,
opens the locked envelope partially on a specific position.
Positions of different authorities overlap each other in order
to communicate robustness of the protocol. If an envelope is
partially opened by a sufficient (threshold) amount of election
authorities, the envelope can be opened on the WBB and the
election result can be computed (see Figure 2(c)).
C. Structure and Content of the Tutorial
The presentation is divided into the voting protocol and
the main part, namely the distributed key generation and
decryption. The voting protocol is explained in the following
way: (a) We first outline the voter experience as follows:
The WBB provides empty ballots and election locks which
can be picked by voters. After a voter picked those items,
she fills her ballot (resulting in a vote), puts the filled vote
in an envelope and locks that envelope with the election
lock. Afterwards, the voter puts the envelope into a second,
personalized envelope. The voter sends this envelope to the
WBB. Here, all other voters’ envelopes are stored as well.
(b) Then we continue with tallying: After the election has
been finished, the outer envelopes are checked against the
electoral register such that only eligible votes are included
in the election result. Thereafter, the remaining envelopes are
opened and the inner envelopes are taken out. These inner
envelopes are shuffled with the mix-net, i.e. the shuffling box.
Eventually, the anonymized, locked envelopes are opened with
the election key and the election result can be computed.
For the main part, we decided not to immediately explain
the different stages of the application but deduce the solution
from identified problems step by step. The motivation behind
this idea is that people better understand why the application
is needed at all and why certain manual checks are necessary.
Correspondingly, we start with the situation in which the
election key is held by one single election authority. We
demonstrate that this single authority can break secrecy in
case it behaves maliciously (problem 1): Rather than decrypt-
ing anonymized votes, the malicious authority could decrypt
personalized votes from the WBB.
As solution to this problem, it is shown that an election key
can physically be split apart. The pieces of the election key
can then be distributed to a set of election authorities such that
only the collaboration of all authorities allows reconstructing
the election key and tallying the election. In this case, it is
then shown that a malicious election authority cannot break
secrecy anymore. However, it is demonstrated that a malicious
(or simply failing) election authority who does not participate
in key reconstruction prevents the honest election authorities
from tallying the election (problem 2).
As solution to this second problem, we introduce the notion
of key shares being information to reconstruct a key such
that any subset of a specified number (threshold) of election
authorities have enough information to reconstruct the key. As
such we move from the physical to the digital world. The
education material shows that the previous problem is solved.
However, it proceeds with the danger that arises from a single
key distribution or key reconstruction computer. If one of these
computers behaves maliciously, it might store the election key
in its entirety and use it to open personalized votes, thereby
violating secrecy (problem 3).
The solution to this problem is refraining from the com-
puter in the construction and reconstruction phases, which
has possession of the entire election key. To that end, rather
than having any centralized key component, the entire key
generation and tallying processes are conducted in a decen-
tralized manner exchanging a couple of messages over the
Internet (while so far the key shares were distributed in
person). It is explained that this approach solves the previous
problem. However, we then mention the problem of untrusted
channels (such as the Internet) used to exchange messages. An
adversary might read the exchanged messages and obtain the
knowledge of each individual election authority. We explain
how an adversary gets sufficiently many key reconstruction
descriptions in order to obtain the entire election key, thereby
breaking secrecy (problem 4).
As a solution to this problem, the establishment of secure
channels between participants is explained which should then
be used to securely interchange the messages. Therefore, each
individual election authority generates her own personal key
and the corresponding locks. Each election authority sends out
her locks to all other election authorities. Eventually, each
election authority can use another authority’s lock to send
confidential messages to that authority. However, the adversary
is also able to change messages sent on the network. As
such the adversary might replace locks sent out from one
election authority by different (own) locks. If the adversary
replaces all authorities’ locks accordingly, he will obtain all
authorities’ knowledge and still violate secrecy as described
above (problem 5). As a solution, we explain that each voter
combines her individual generated lock with all other obtained
locks in terms of the different colours.
The solution to problem 3 outlined above refrains from the
reconstruction machine in the tallying phase. Correspondingly,
it is demonstrated how tallying can be conducted without
reconstructing the election key by applying the metaphor of
partially opening envelope. Then it is explained that an attacker
could replace single partially opened envelopes when sent
from one authority to another or to the WBB (problem 6).
As a solution seals were introduced. Thus, actually, after an
authority partially opened the envelope, she puts her own seal
on the envelope indicating that this has been opened by her.
Eventually, it was outlined that one application can be provided
as explained in the last solution. If, however, this application
is implemented from one single institute, the institute might
secretly introduce backdoors, thereby endangering secrecy of
integrity (problem 7). Therefore, as final improvement we
outlined that the application is therefore implemented by
different TPIs from which it can be downloaded.
VII. EVALUATION
The goal of the user evaluation was two-fold: The first goal
was to evaluate the usability of the implemented application,
i.e. that users are able to run all the protocol steps and conduct
the checks they are asked to execute. The second goal was to
evaluate the understandability, i.e. whether the used education
material enabled the participants to understand the application
in terms of its objectives and the underlying security model.
A. Evaluation Setup
The evaluation of the application has been conducted on
five Samsung Galaxy S3 devices due to their widespread
use. Based upon previous studies, five in Germany trusted
public institutions were chosen, namely the Federal Office
for Information Security, the Federal Constitutional Court,
the Federal Electoral Management Body, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Federal
Statistical Office. For the test election, a WBB has been set up
on which relevant data of the test election has been published
and shown to the participants. The test election included 208
test votes on the WBB in order to diminish the pure decryption
time from 20 minutes to 5 minutes. We generated Gmail
accounts for each participant throughout the evaluation.
B. Participants
We decided to conduct the evaluation separately for groups
of five participants. We recruited the participants via emails
sent out around the Technische Universität Darmstadt. These
shall be persons with non-expert knowledge in computer
science and information security in order to reliably represent
election authorities of Internet elections.
C. Questionnaire
For the usability evaluation, we use the standard usability
criteria defined in [41], namely effectiveness, efficiency, and
satisfaction, as a basis. We measured the effectiveness of the
application in terms of the fact whether participants achieved
their goal of generating an election key in a distributed way
correctly and of distributively tallying the election and by the
number of questions raised to achieve their goal. Efficiency
has been determined by the time it took the participants to
finish their task. Satisfaction has been evaluated with the
system usability scale (SUS) [42], which is a ten-item standard
questionnaire. The questions regarding understandability were
tested in a pre-evaluation and improved accordingly. Questions
of the final questionnaire were as follows: The first question
regarded secrecy of the vote, the second one - the robustness
of the system. The participants were asked to check all the
options that would be able to violate secrecy or robustness
respectively. The questionnaire’s options for answering these
questions were presented in a way that several responses
should immediately follow from the educational part, while
other responses required the transfer of learned concepts.
We then evaluated the number of correct responses for each
questionnaire. After each participant filled and handed in
her individual questionnaire, the participants were asked to
discuss their own understanding among themselves and fill one
questionnaire together afterwards. This second questionnaire
was motivated by the observation other fields or research,
e.g., genetics [43] and biochemistry [44]. These works provide
evidence that group discussions foster students’ understanding
of learned concepts.
D. Evaluation Process
After an informal welcome, the participants – who played
the role of election authorities – were asked whether they
agree to have their voices recorded. All of them accepted. All
participants had to pass through four sequential phases.
First Phase. The first phase, the education phase, consisted
of three parts. In the first part, participants were made familiar
with the motivation and the goal of the evaluation process. The
participants were told the cover story that the Technische Uni-
versität Darmstadt plans the implementation of Internet voting
for the next University election. Then participants were asked
to shortly introduce themselves. In the second part, the general
concept of the Internet voting scheme as outlined in section II
was introduced. Finally, the participants were asked whether
there were questions. The third part was the presentation of the
education material in terms of a tutorial, i.e. a presentation by
the instructor. During the presentation, the instructor made 5
breaks for questions. Afterwards, participants were provided
with their credentials in closed envelopes and a one-page
guideline containing the names of the election authorities,
parties from which they were delegated, the election threshold,
and the election website.
Second Phase. In the second phase, participants used the
developed application for a test election scenario. Participants
were first introduced into the process and their duties. After
entering their credentials and the election website, participants
started the process. During its first execution, the application
crashed during the initialization of the key generation protocol.
One of the supervisors supported the participants to restart the
application. After the restart the application continued in the
step right after the verification of communication keys. After
having generated the key shares in a distributed way, partici-
pants were told that for this evaluation the vote casting phase
is skipped, and they already are in the next election phase,
namely the tallying phase. Participants started the application
again, used the application to distributively decrypt the test
cast votes, and compared the results on their smartphone with
the election result on the WBB. During the decryption phase
participants were told that it might take some time, because
of expensive mathematical operations executed for decrypting
cast votes. Furthermore, participants were explained why they
can trust the results shown on the WBB, as the general public
can verify the correctness proofs of the decryption phase that
are also posted on the WBB.
Third Phase. In the third phase, participants filled ques-
tionnaires regarding the understandability and usability of the
application, covered in the first and the second phase. Further-
more, demographic data were collected. The demographic data
were collected separately from the questionnaire, in order to
ensure anonymity.
Fourth Phase. In the fourth and last phase, participants
were debriefed, indicating that the application will not be used
for the next University elections, but maybe in the near future
this might be considered. Finally, the supervisors thanked the
participants and compensated them with 16 Euro each.
VIII. RESULTS
This section summarizes the findings of the evaluation
with the first five participants. These were 1 female and 4
male students aged between 21 and 26. Two of them were
Albanians, one was German, one Kenyan, and one Indian. The
participants studied mechanical engineering, physics, architec-
ture, electrical engineering, and materials science.
A. Usability
Effectiveness. In order to achieve their goal of generating
the election key and tallying the election correctly, the partic-
ipants had to solve four sub-goals in the setup phase, namely
accepting to participate in the distributed key generation with
the announced head, validating the exchanged communication
keys, agreeing on the participating election authorities and
the threshold, and verifying the election key. In the tallying
phase, the participants had to solve two sub-goals, namely
accepting the initiation of the tallying process and comparing
the announced election result to the locally computed election
result. Only if all six sub-goals are achieved, the overall goal is
achieved. The observation of participants and the audio-record
revealed that all six sub-goals were achieved such that the
overall goal has been achieved by the participants.
Shortly after all participants entered their login data and the
election website into the application, the application crashed
due to network problems with one smartphone. The organizers
had to intervene and restart the application in order to dissolve
confusion among the participants. After restarting the app, the
head of the election authorities was required to read out the
security phrase aloud which was not clear to her such that a
further question was asked to the organizers. Eventually, in
the tallying phase, after the head of the election authorities
initiated the tallying process and all other authorities were
invited to participate in the tallying, one participant asked if she
should join the tallying. After the tallying has been conducted
in distributed manner, the result was shown on each individual
smartphone and on the public WBB. One participant raised
the question whether the results should be exported or if the
application can be closed. The results show that the participants
achieved their task of generating the key in a distributed way
and tallying an election without major problems. Nevertheless,
the questions raised by the participants indicate that both the
communication key validation and election result verification
processes must be made more clear within the application.
Efficiency. In order to achieve their goal of setting up an
election key and tallying an election afterwards, the partici-
pants in collaboration needed 32 minutes. Given 824 postal
votes within an average German district, the time needed to
generate the election key and tally the election would increase
to 47 minutes. Given the fact that complex ballots might be
easily encoded within a single El-Gamal ciphertext, this time
indicates significant efficiency improvements.
Satisfaction. The SUS questionnaire has been slightly
adapted to our smartphone application. To prevent confusion,
the term system has been replaced by the term application.
Thereby, the participants were clearly pointed to the smart-
phone application rather than to the overarching Internet voting
system. Scoring of the questionnaires resulted in an average
value of 82.5. According to Sauro’s normalization method
[45], a value above 80.3 results in an A grading and as such
the application is more likely to be recommended.
B. Understandability
Regarding secrecy, correct responses that should immedi-
ately follow from the education were The institution which
provided the mobile election authority application on the
smartphone I used, An outsider controlling the wireless net-
work, Intermediate Internet servers, Your research group,
Internet Provider, Smartphone manufacturer, and The Shuffling
component. The matching of the mental security model of
individual participants with the real security model was on
average 56%. Interestingly, the later discussion directed the
mental model of the group in the right direction such that a
matching of 88% was obtained. Including transfer responses
into the immediate responses results in an average individual
matching of 50% and a group (after discussion) matching
of 70%. With respect to robustness, the immediate responses
slightly differ from immediate responses regarding secrecy15.
The immediate responses for robustness are: The smartphone
I used, The institution which provided the mobile election
authority application on the smartphone I used, Your research
group, four, three, two, and one other election authority, If I
collaborate with all others election authorities, Any voter, The
Shuffling component, All voters together. The average rate of
correct responses, which reflects the matching of individual
mental models with the real security model equals 71%, while
the later group discussion resulted in a group matching of
100%. Including the transfer responses, the individual mental
model matching is 58% and 78%.
As seen, the prepared education material had not the ex-
pected effect on the participants’ understanding of the security
model. Therefore, we decided not to continue the evaluation
with more participants, but rather to revise education material
before re-running the evaluation.
15This stems for instance from the fact that with respect to secrecy, we
considered that election authorities might be corrupt and hire a information
security expert to obtain election key reconstruction data from the smartphone,
while the participants considered only the election authority’s personal skills.
On the other hand, with respect to robustness, even a non-expert authority
might decide to destroy her smartphone thereby making her key reconstruction
description unavailable.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The present work pursued two goals. The first goal was to
develop a usable application for the tasks of election author-
ities that consists of distributed key generation and verifiable
distributed decryption, thus furthering the implementation of
electronic voting protocols that make use of these concepts.
The second goal was to communicate the security model used
in electronic voting protocols (with particular focus on our
application) to laymen.
We developed education material using metaphors to ex-
plain the cryptographic concepts behind our application. The
initiated evaluation has shown that the security model of the
application has not been understood to a satisfactory extent
on an individual level. Therefore, we decided not to continue
the user evaluation, but rather revise our education material
before running a complete user evaluation. Interestingly, we
found that group discussion among the participants fostered
their understanding such that the secrecy model for immediate
responses was understood to 88% and the robustness model to
100%.
The developed application is promising as the initiated
evaluation shows. The participants of our evaluation who
had no prior knowledge of information security, despite the
issues that occurred during the key generation stage, found
the application easy to use, giving it an average SUS score of
82.5, which is well above the global average [42], [45]. While
the number of participants in insufficient in drawing reliable
statistical conclusions regarding the application usability, the
findings, however, indicate a trend towards finding the appli-
cation usable.
For the future, we intend to integrate the essential parts
of the group discussion into our education material and run a
complete user evaluation. Second, we intend to consider the
impact of adversarial behavior on the application’s usability.
From a technical perspective, we are currently integrating
authentication measures into the application in order to protect
sensitive election information such as secret key shares. We are
furthermore integrating the application into the Helios voting
system [46] which has been extensively studied in the litera-
ture, see for instance [47]. The conducted research represents a
further step towards secure and transparent electronic elections.
We are convinced that prior to deploying electronic voting for
high-stake elections, election authorities and the public need to
understand the overall security of the voting system as well as
the remaining risks to gain trust in the election and its result.
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